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Summary of the project and its objectives
The UK is in a critical juncture with regard to the process of negotiations to leave the European 
Union. Important discussions are taking place which will shape the future relation between 
Britain and the EU. The economic analyses published on the issue have, so far, largely failed to 
grasp the attention of the general public. Most of the discussions about Brexit have focused 
at a national level and there has been very little evidence-based discussion at a local level. 
This project aims at stimulating a reflexive participatory research process involving citizens, 
policy-makers, business people and civil-society representatives. It introduces an innovative 
methodology that contextualises quantitative data through expert interviews and the analysis 
of local sources. The reports and discussion panels organised within the framework of the 
project seek to increase our understanding about the impact of Brexit at a local level.
This report contributes to the broader research project co-ordinated by 
the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE).
Understanding Brexit impacts at a local level 
Southampton case study
This study focuses on the perceived impact of Brexit on British local authorities. Five local 
authority case studies have been selected: Mansfield, Pendle, Ceredigion, Southampton and 
Barnet. As the aim of the broader study is to understand the impact of Brexit at the local level, 
this report is informed chiefly by the qualitative interviews, while the interviews themselves were 
conditioned by the quantitative impact assessments (see Appendix on page 14) that rely on 
nation-wide economic data.
SOUTHAMPTON
Front cover: Control tower, Southampton Docks
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Executive summary
The Brexit vote was a response to local economic 
mismanagement of public services following the 
rapid surge of Eastern European immigrants after 
EU enlargement. It also mirrored a desire to retain 
sovereignty against the unaccountable and mistrusted 
EU. Polarisation between ‘Remainers’ and ‘Leavers’ is 
likely to persist unless any exogenous shock occurs.
Immigration appears to be a crucial factor behind Brexit 
support and economic and policy impacts.
According to local experts and reports, only a ‘short-term 
slow growth’ is expected after Brexit as Southampton is 
not heavily dependent on EU funding or exposed to EU 
markets. Yet, wealth creation and productivity growth 
will be particularly affected as opposed to job creation, 
as well as an increased pressure on maintaining decent 
standards of living.
There is a widespread concern regarding the expected 
loss of EU funding and shortage of skilled labour in 
hospitals and universities following restricted migration 
with Brexit. The lack of clarity with regards to what the 
negotiation deal will look like also creates an uncertain 
and low-growth business environment.
A Brexit opportunity with higher levels of trade of the Port 
with non-EU countries can be foreseen, yet it is contingent 
upon the Brexit deal. Even the softest version of Brexit is 
likely to impose export duties that would increase costs 
and restrict in some way the free movement of goods. 
Local projects to revitalise the city centre may include 
urban planning, sectoral and cluster development to 
increase high value jobs and unionisation of migrant 
workers for better integration, while securing the basic 
needs of the population.
However, the Southampton port, the top British port for trade 
with countries outside the EU, embodies the post-Brexit 
successful model of frictionless international commerce 
that aims to be replicated in other UK ports that mainly 
trade with EU countries (i.e. the Ports of Dover, Felixstowe). 
Opportunities ranging from urban planning, entrepreneurial 
boost to unionising migrant workers could help reinvigorate 
and strengthen Southampton.   
This report is a part of the first wave of the project: 
‘Understanding Brexit impact at local level.’ The main objective 
of this project is to improve Governance after Brexit by 
increasing knowledge and awareness of the differentiated 
impact of Brexit at local levels. 
While there has been a lot of research on the macro-economic 
impact of different Brexit scenarios, including broader regional 
impacts, and on the impact on specific sectors (e.g. agriculture, 
manufacturing, fisheries and education), there has been very 
little locally-based research. A second objective is to contribute 
to better-quality discussion and debate. By fostering evidence-
based discussions at the local level and engaging policy-
makers and citizens in the process of defining priorities and 
concerns, we aim to help achieve better outcomes for their 
local areas in the EU exit process.
This report relies both on qualitative field research and 
socio-economic quantitative analysis. Interviews with local 
stakeholders were conducted in Southampton in May-June 
2018. The recorded interviews lasted between half an hour and 
two hours. Phone and Skype interviews were also conducted. 
Interviews included general questions such as the local 
reasons behind the Brexit vote and the people’s perceptions’ 
of Brexit, and more specific questions about the likely impacts 
of Brexit on various sectors of the economy depending on the 
expertise of the interviewees.
We talked to local experts from various professional 
backgrounds (academia, politics, unions, businesses) and 
divergent political sides to give a well-grounded and in-depth 
picture of the projected economic and social effects on the 
local authority of Southampton. In order to capture the widest 
range of opinions, the local political representatives come from 
across the political spectrum and equally represent the voices 
of ‘Leavers’ and ‘Remainers’ from different wards.  
This report is also based on desk research of local and national 
news reporting on Southampton (The Southern Daily Echo, the 
Guardian) as well as on quantitative analysis from a variety of 
sources, notably from the Centre of Economic Performance 
(CEP) at the London School of Economics and Political Science 
(LSE), Health and Social Care Information Centre (NHS Digital) 
and the Solent Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP) report of 
economic predictions in the South East region.
After providing a contextual overview of Southampton, the 
report will highlight the factors behind its Brexit support and 
the ways in which Brexit is likely to impact the city’s economy. 
It will then expose the challenges and future opportunities 
posed by Brexit for Southampton. 
Introduction
This report shows a contrasting picture for Southampton. On the one hand, the 
decreasing number of immigrants from EU states is likely to produce a shortage 
of skilled labour and reductions of funding in hospitals and universities, as well 
as an overall slowdown growth.
Image 1: Southampton Civic Centre
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The city has a sizeable non-UK population of around 22.9 %.1 
In particular, Southampton has been a high-density post-
accession Polish destination. It is estimated that there are 
8,391 Polish workers living in Southampton, comprising 3,5% of 
the population of the city.2 
Southampton’s port is the busiest cruise terminal and second 
largest container port in the UK. It is currently the number 
one vehicle-handling port, while vying with Felixstowe as the 
top-performing container terminal. Its deep-water quay is built 
to handle the biggest ships in the world. As the biggest export 
port in the UK, it handles £40 billion worth of exports every 
year.3 Its continued success is vital to the city’s economy, 
and as a regional retail and economic centre, Southampton’s 
economy is heavily reliant upon its transport links. It annually 
contributes one billion pounds to the UK economy4. 
1 Southampton City Council. 2016. Mid year population estimate 2016. Available at: https://www.southampton.gov.uk/council-democracy/council-data/statistics/
mye-southampton.aspx.
2 Ibid.
3 Southampton Port set for record export year, Institute of Export and International, July 2017, Available at: https://www.export.org.uk/news/354558/Southampton-
Port-set-for-record-export-year.htm.
4 Oxford Economics. 2017. Solent Local Entreprise Partnership Report : Baseline forecast and the Implications of Brexit. Available at: https://solentlep.org.uk/
media/1887/solent-lep-baseline-forecasts-and-the-implications-of-brexit.pdf.
5 Rumfitt, A. 2017. Analysing ‘Brexit’ : Opportunities and challenges for economic growth. Journal of Urban Regenerationa and Renewal, Vol. 10, 3, pp. 216-226.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
Southampton has shown a strong post-recession 
recovery, growing by 8%, or 8,000 jobs, since 2009. In 2015 
Southampton’s economy provided jobs to 107,000 people.5 
This growth has been driven by the expansion of business 
and support services, health services and the transport sector, 
together adding 10,000 jobs.6 Where job losses did occur, these 
were highest in the financial and insurance services and in 
manufacturing, where 3,500 jobs were lost.7
It is considered an area of low unemployment (6%), with below 
average wages and productivity and a large concentration of 
jobs in retail, management and professional sectors. As Figure 
2 shows, one in six of all jobs is related to the dock functions 
and associated activities. There is 
also  a concentration of health 
jobs linked to a hospital-
university nexus, which 
constitutes the highest 
concentration of managers 
and professionals among 
residents.8 By 2015 nearly 
20% of all employment was in 
the health services sector.9 
 White UK born 74.8%
 White not UK born 11.8%
 Ethnic minority UK born 3.8%
 Ethnic minority not UK born 9.6%
Southampton in context
Southampton is a middle-sized city of 236,882 inhabitants, characterised by an 
ageing population and low population growth. 
Figure 1: Southampton population by ethnicity, 2016.
1 in 6 jobs in 
Southampton are 
related to the docks
3.5%
of the population 
of the city are 
Polish
Source: Annual Population Survey.
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Figure 2:  Employment share in key industries for Southampton, 1984 to 2015
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The factors that pushed the residents to cast a Brexit ballot 
shed light on the socio-economic impact of Brexit on the town’s 
economy. The Brexit vote in Southampton was reflective of a 
divided city between ‘Remainers’ in the West and ‘Leavers’ in 
the East whose polarisation may constitute a continuous risk 
factor to the unity of the city. The main arguments behind Brexit 
that emerged from the interviews emphasise the immigration 
matter given the rapid surge of Eastern European migrants and 
the sovereignty rationale with the desire to ‘take back control’ 
from the EU and London-led elite. 
The Brexit vote in Southampton typically ‘embodied the 
broader socio-political divide we saw across the UK’ as argued 
by Professor Will Jennings.10 Overall 53.8 % voted ‘Leave’.11 
Southampton has a history of marginal Parliamentary seats 
and wards. There are two constituencies, split between the 
Labour and Conservative parties, and two distinct socio-
economic profiles: the cosmopolitan and ethnically diverse 
Western part of the city with young mobile students or 
professionals who voted ‘Remain’ (Southampton Test) versus 
the white working-class constituency who voted ‘Leave’ in 
the East (Southampton Itchen).12 Wards that mainly voted 
‘Leave’ used to register a higher share of UKIP support, which 
is in line with previous findings and research conducted at 
LSE.13 However, different wards voted differently within the 
constituency. In Southampton Test, not far from the large
10 Interview with Will Jennings, 17 May 2018.
11 EU Referendum Results, 1998-2018. Available at : https://www.southampton.gov.uk/council-democracy/voting-and-elections/elections-and-referenda/previous-
elections-results.aspx.
12 Interview with Will Jennings, 17 May 2018. See also Jennings W. and Stocker G. 2016. The Bifurcation of Politics: Two Englands.The Political Quaterly. Vol 83, 3, 
pp.372-382.
13 Goodwin M. J. and Heath O. 2016. The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-level Analysis of the Result. The Political Quaterly. Vol. 87, 3, pp. 
323-332. Hobolt S. 2017. The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided Continent. Journal of European Public Policy. Vol. 23, 9, pp. 1259-1277. 
14 Interview with Councillor Andrew Pope and Former Council Candidate Denise Wyatt, 6 June 2018.
15 Swales K. 2016. Understanding the Leave Vote. NatCen Social Research. Available at : http://natcen.ac.uk/media/1319222/natcen_brexplanations-report-final-web2.pdf.
16 Interviews with Councillor Andrew Pope and Denise Wyatt, 6 June 2018.
17 Goodwin M. and Milazzo C. 2017. Taking Back Control ? Investigating the Role of Immigration in the 2016 Vote for Brexit. The British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, Vol. 19, 3, pp.450-464.
18 Interview with Councillor Andrew Pope, 6 June 2018.
19 Kaufmann E. 2017. Levels or Changes?: Ethnic Context, Immigration and the UK Independence Party Vote. Electoral Studies. 48, pp. 57-69.
20 Jennings W. and Stoker G. 2017. Tilting towards the cosmopolitan axis? Political change in England and the 2017 general election. The Political Quarterly, 
Vol. 88, 3, pp. 359-369.
concentration of Polish migrants in Shirley and Portswood, the 
Redbridge ward voted ‘Leave’ by a landslide.14  
The literature has emphasised the importance of identity 
on the Leave vote where people were not persuaded by 
arguments about economic risks.15 Yet, such arguments do 
not encapsulate all positions of the ‘Leavers’ in Southampton. 
Across all interviews, the local economic pressure on public 
services following the rapid and unprecedented influx of 
Eastern European immigrants was stressed as a key driver 
behind the Leave vote.16 The formerly Labour-supporting 
traditional working class slowly turned to support UKIP and 
the Brexit vote given the increasing economic strains that 
immigration put on schools and housing.17 Councillor Andrew 
Pope advances from his data collection of his Redbridge ward 
that a shortage of places in primary schools escalated from 
‘5 to 15 % in less than five years’.18 However, he also confirms 
Professor Eric Kaufmann’s findings that it is the rapid rise of 
immigration inflow rather than established levels of migration 
that fosters anti-immigrant resentment.19
This contextual factor was accompanied by political 
disenchantment with the party system and its representatives 
amongst the traditional working class who used to vote 
Labour.20 Professor Will Jennings emphasised that this 
segment of the party sympathisers lost faith in Labour during 
The Brexit vote ‘A divided city’
Underscoring the reasons behind the Brexit vote in Southampton is key to better 
understanding the concerns and policy priorities of the local population.
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Tony Blair’s leadership after it failed to tackle the long-term 
structural issues of immigration.21 Labour MP for Southampton 
Itchen, John Denham, wrote a memo to Blair two years after 
EU accession to warn them that the number of immigrants 
was far higher than the government’s figures had forecast.22 
He argued that many new arrivals were not using the worker 
registration scheme (many were self-employed), instead 
offering themselves to construction sites: the daily rate as a 
builder in the city had thus fallen by 50% in those 18 months.23 
An education college also had to close its doors after 1,000 
migrants attempted to sign up for an English-as-second-
language course in one day.24 In addition, recent economic 
development of the city prioritised rebranding the city centre, 
which is worth millions, over providing basic needs to the 
local population.25 Such increase of dire economic conditions 
resulted in the rise in popularity of a protective nationalism.26 
The immigrants became the ‘personified symptoms of 
mismanagement of local economy’ as advanced by the Leader 
of Southampton Independents and former Council candidate 
Denise Wyatt.27 Whereas the legitimate anxiety created by 
immigration was not discussed in the Remain campaign, the 
Leave campaign vocally expressed an anti-immigrant narrative 
that resonated in the local population’s minds.
Notwithstanding this anti-immigrant resentment, Alan Whitehead 
MP highlights that there is also a concentration of a well-
integrated immigrant population in the Western part of the 
city where residents mainly voted Remain, mostly among the 
old established immigrant population.28 A large presence of 
economically active residents who initially filled in jobs residents 
did not desire (cleaners, shop-workers) or highly-qualified roles 
(the high community of Italian and Portuguese immigrants in 
hospitals, academia) strongly contributed to the local economy.29 
All Councillors who were interviewed pointed out that the highly-
qualified immigrant population from Southern Europe is better 
integrated than the less-qualified Eastern European population. 
This is in line with the literature that shows that high-skilled 
immigrants are preferred over low-skilled immigrants.30
21 Interview with Will Jennings, 17 May 2018.
22 Farrell J. and Goldsmith P., 2017. How to Lose a Referendum : The Definitive Story of Why the UK Voted Brexit. Biteback Publishing. 
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Rachel Adams.  2016. Multi-million pound plans to transform Bargate centre in Southampton revealed. The Southern Daily Echo. May. 
26 Interview with Councillor Andrew Pope, 6 June 2018.
27 Interview with Denise Wyatt, 6 June 2018.
28 Interview with Alan Whitehead MP, 22 May 2018.
29 Ibid. 
30 Hainumeller J. 2010. Attitudes towards Highly Skilled and Low Skilled Immigrtion: Evidence from a Survey Experiment. American Political Science Review. 104, 01, 
pp. 61-84.
31 Interview with Alan Whitehead MP, 22 May 2018.
32 Ibid.
33 McLaren. L. M. 2003. Anti-immigrant Prejudice in Europe : Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants. Social Forces. 81, 3. pp. 909-936.
34 Interview with Councillors Ivan White and Andrew Pope, 6 June 2018. 
35 Ford R. and Goodwin M. 2014. Revolt on the Right : Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain. Routledge. 
36 Interview with Councillor Andrew Pope and Denise Wyatt, 6 June 2018. 
37 Ibid.
Interestingly enough, as Alan Whitehead MP pointed out, the 
Eastern part of the city, which has far fewer immigrants, mainly 
voted Leave31. This indicates that it is rather the perceived threat 
of close exposure and not immediate contact with immigrants 
that drives people’s anti-immigrant Brexit support.32 Given their 
close but not immediate proximity, people are more sympathetic 
to the Brexit narrative that portrays immigrants as scapegoats. 
This corroborates the ‘contact’ theory that long-term exposure 
to immigrants increases tolerance towards immigrants.33
Image 3: Councillor Andrew Pope and Redbridge Towers
Another influential anti-EU argument that came in most 
interviews was the desire to take back control from the EU.34 
The vote against EU membership represented a vote against 
‘out-of-touch’ and mistrusted government by a population 
who believes the political elite no longer has their interests at 
heart.35  Councillor Andrew Pope and Former Council Candidate 
Denise Wyatt claim that the fact that the local campaign 
ignored local issues to instead focus on the national picture 
contributed to this increased disaffection with the London elite 
and the EU.36 A telling example they mentioned was the fire 
which killed two firefighters in the Shirley Towers in April 2010. 
Following the Grenfell incident37, some local councillors have 
raised concerns to strongly recommend sprinklers to be fitted 
7
in existing high-rise blocks.38 Although the Towers have been 
tested and now meet all government safety standards, some 
local councillors and media (image 4) have reprised this issue 
in the last local election in the city. Such political distrust has 
led to the rise of the Independent party.
Since the EU referendum, the issue of Brexit was ignored 
in the 2017 General Election at the local level and has been 
ever since by local councillors given its highly politicised 
and divisive nature. A crystallised identity cleavage is likely 
to persist.39 Will Jennings argues that ‘unless an important 
exogenous shock or drastic change of public opinion will 
happen, the polarisation is likely to continue’.40 As long as 
people feel that they have no influence over the immediate 
circumstances within which they live, then divisions will 
become ever more entrenched and inflammatory.41 There 
is also a large sense of frustration among both Leavers 
and Remainers with regards to the negotiation process. 
Interviewees pointed to feelings of disappointment among the 
former and disenchantment and unwanted change among the 
latter.42 Such cleavage may become a driving principle in post-
EU-exit policy-making in Southampton.
38 Ibid.
39 Hobolt S. 2017. The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided Continent. Journal of European Public Policy. Vol. 23, 9, pp. 1259-1277. 
40 Interview with Will Jennings, 17 May 2018.
41 Ibid.
42 Interviews with Councillors Ivan White and Andrew Pope, 6 June 2018.
43 Interview with Anne-Marie Mountifield at a Built Environment Networking event in Ross A. 2018. Brexit slow-down will be ‘short-term’ say LEP. Southern Daily Echo, 
7 June. Available at : http://www.dailyecho.co.uk/news/16275241.brexit-slow-down-will-beshort-term-says-lep/.
44 Ibid.
45 Centre of Economic Performance Estimates, LSE, 2017
46 Solent LEP Report. 2017. 
47 Written Statement via Email by Neil McCullough, 28 May 2018.
48 PwC Report, 2018 Good Growth for Cities Index, https://www.pwc.co.uk/who-we-are/regional-sites/south-east/press-releases/good-growth-for-cities.html
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Hometrack UK. 2016. UK Cities House Price Index. Available at: https://www.hometrack.com/uk/insight/uk-cities-house-price-index/
The economic challenges
Despite expecting a low-growth pattern in the short term, 
Southampton’s growth will not be hit as hard as cities that 
heavily depend on EU funds or the market. Instead, economic 
pressure will be put on the lack of wealth creation and productivity, 
combined with extra pressure on public services and potential loss 
of EU funding for academia and health services. 
Southampton is expected to see ‘a short-term slow down’ in 
growth after Brexit due to the uncertainty and more cautious 
investment environment, according to Anne Marie Mountifield, 
the Chief Executive of New Hampshire local enterprise 
partnership.43 The inability of the UK government to provide 
a clear preferred deal has prevented businesses from seizing 
opportunities for growth, which results in lower investment in 
local communities. These effects of current low growth are 
visible in all parts of the UK, and only likely to improve as the 
Brexit deal becomes clearer.44
With regards to the likely effects of Brexit on growth in 
Southampton, the LSE’s CEP predicts a decline of 1.2 % on 
growth for a soft Brexit negotiation deal in comparison to 
a fall of 1.9% for a hard Brexit.45 While not negligible, this is 
relatively lower than cities that heavily rely on financial services, 
like London, or on EU funding. The South East funding from 
European sources is minimal as Neil McCullough, the Associate 
Director at Oxford Economics who contributed to the Solent 
LEP report that assessed socio-economic impact of the South 
East region, states it.46
Neil McCullough also asserts that the economic challenge 
does not lie in job loss since unemployment is low, but rather 
in the lack of wealth creation and productivity, combined 
with increasingly difficult conditions for maintaining decent 
standards of living.47 Despite living in an affluent region 
with employment opportunities thanks to the University of 
Southampton48, the local population has low-paid jobs, mostly 
in the retail sector.49 There have also been a rise of rent prices 
and decline of homeownership50, as seen by a sharp increase 
of 12% in rent prices in 2016 compared to 2015, the fourth 
biggest increase among major UK cities.51 As commodity 
Image 4: The Southern Daily Echo front page, 11 April 2017
Image 5: Stack of shipping containers piled up on a container  ship in the ABP port of Southampton 
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prices are expected to rise from 4 to 7% on average,52 the living 
expenses will put an extra pressure on households, which is 
likely to become a serious concern among the population, as 
stressed by most councillors. 
The stagnant economy in the city comes from the economic 
geography and historical legacy of typical British post-
war development plans that did not revitalise the city.53 
Southampton was pulverised by bombs during the Second 
World War and had to be rebuilt at speed, which resulted in 
Soviet-style concrete and rushed planning. Moreover, the 
stagnant economy has not developed as much other dock 
cities like Leeds or Liverpool.54 Unlike in these cities where 
docks ceased to be relevant, the Southampton docks need 
to stay working as their productivity has increased.55 Local 
councillors highlighted that less money from the government 
has been poured into the city than other dock cities.56
52 Centre of Economic Performance, LSE. Available at: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cp518.pdf
53 Interview with Will Jennings, 17 May 2018.
54  Interviews with Councillor Ivan White, 4 June 2018, and Alan Whitehead MP, 22 May 2018.
55  Ibid.
56  Interviews with Councillor Andrew Pope and Denise Wyatt, 6 June 2018.
57  Matthews D. 2016. Which universities would lose out from Brexit? Times Higher Education. 25 May. Available at: https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/
which-universities-would-lose-out-from-brexit#survey-answer.  
58  Interview with Will Jennings, 17 May 2018.
59 Highman L. 2018. Eu students at UK universities : Patterns and trends. LSE Brexit Blog. 13 April. Available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/04/13/eu-students-at-
uk-universities-patterns-and-trends/
60 Interview with Sir Christoper Snowden. 2016. What Brexit means for us. University of Southampton website. Available at: https://connects.soton.ac.uk/feature/what-
brexit-means-for-us
Another negative economic implication is a potential loss of 
funding for research in the two main universities, the University 
of Southampton and Southampton Solent University. It is 
particularly concerning for the latter since it is the British 
university which relies the most on EU funding, with 91.35% 
of competitive grant research income from the EU from 2006 
to 2015.57 While the government has said they will safeguard 
research funding already approved, that nevertheless leaves 
considerable long-term uncertainty on whether Horizon 2020 
programmes are maintained, as Will Jennings argues.58 Unless 
the EU funding for research is replaced by direct grants from 
the UK government or by other benefactors, the quantity and/
or quality of research could suffer due to lack of finance. 
The current high number of EU students at the University of 
Southampton (7.2 %), which contributes to the diversity of the 
student fabric and the international university reputation, is also 
in jeopardy because non-UK EU students will no longer be able 
to pay home tuition fees but will be charged higher overseas 
fees and will need a visa to study.59 Vice-Chancellor Professor 
Sir Christopher Snowden at the University of Southampton 
holds that ‘whether this will be a financial benefit or deficit is yet 
to be determined’.60 
Image 5: Stack of shipping containers piled up on a container  ship in the ABP port of Southampton 
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Image 6: Polish Shop in Southampton
The immigration effects
Southampton is most exposed to the likelihood of restricted 
migration, which will increase the need to fill in highly-skilled  
job vacancies while leaving the integration process of 
immigrants unresolved.
Having experienced above average inward migration per 
thousand of the resident population, at 21.4% when the UK 
average is 10.4%, net migration in Southampton had been 
sufficient to offset the local ageing population.61 Oxford 
Economics and LSE CEP predict a shrinkage of the working-age 
population in absolute terms, which will ultimately decrease the 
productive capacity of the city.62 Neil McCullough argues that 
when the economy gravitates around full employment, as is the 
case in Southampton, productivity becomes the key driver of 
growth.63 Yet, most productivity growth comes from high-paid 
and highly-qualified jobs which are owned by immigrants64. 
Similar to other case studies, a large high-skilled labour 
shortage is expected in academia and in health services.65 
Figures obtained via NHS Digital also reveal that the proportion 
of EU doctors, nurses and other staff members leaving in 
61 Solent LEP Report, 2017 and LSE CEP. 
62 Ibid.
63 Written Statement via Email by Neil McCullough, 28 May 2018.
64 Ibid.
65 Solent LEP Report. 2017.
66 NHS Digital. 2018. NHS Workforce Statistics January 2018. 24 April. Available at: https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/nhs-workforce-
statistics/nhs-workforce-statistics---january-2018.
67 Shaw A. 2017. More EU staff quit Hampshire NHS Trust. The Southern Daily Echo. 16 October. Available at: http://www.dailyecho.co.uk/news/15597559.More_EU_
staff_quit_Hampshire_NHS_trust/. 
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Report from the University of Southampton to Commons Science and Technology Committee. 2016. Leaving the EU : Implications and opportunities for science and 
research. July. Available at: https://www.southampton.ac.uk/publicpolicy/what-we-do/consultations/new-style-responses/leaving-the-eu-implications-and-
opportunities-for-science-and-research.page. 
71 Ibid.
72 Shaw. 2017. 
73 Interview with Alan Fraser, 6 June 2018.
the first six months of 2017 was larger than the entirety of 
2014/2015.66 Danny Mortimer from the Cavendish Coalition 
adds that the University Hospital Southampton NHS 
Foundation Trust is one of 29 in the country where both the 
proportion of EU employees joining the organisation has fallen 
in consecutive years, and the amount of EU employees leaving 
has grown.67 At Solent NHS Trust, the number of staff joining 
from the EU in 2016/2017 was just ten.68 NHS organisations 
are working hard to address staff concerns and better retain 
vital skills, but they also need national support.69 As far as 
the universities are concerned, the uncertainty regarding the 
terms of the UK’s exit from the EU has the potential to deter 
EU students from studying in those universities.70 Currently, 
12% of academics at the University of Southampton are EU 
professors and 18% of PhD students come from the EU.71 
Danny Mortimer advances that a post-Brexit environment will 
require to fill in highly-qualified jobs in academia and health 
services left by EU citizens.72
Brexit will present some local challenges with regards to the 
integration of immigrants.73 Some local unions helped to 
facilitate the arrival of newly EU migrants at their workplaces. 
‘Currently, 12% 
of academics at 
the University of 
Southampton are 
EU professors and 
18% of PhD students 
come from the EU’
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The GMB trade union set up a migrant workers branch in 
Southampton in October 2006. In this branch, workers are 
mainly from Poland but it also includes workers from Pakistan, 
Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Alan Fraser was 
the co-founder and manager of this programme. He said in 
an interview that the GMB’s objective was to recruit and push 
migrant workers to self-organise to take an active role and 
eventually address issues of inequality and discrimination 
that may affect them.74 The GMB was able to organise these 
workers mainly through training and education, offering 
English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) classes and 
advice on employment issues to facilitate their integration. 
Despite an early successful start that saw the rapid growth 
of migrant workers in the union from 56 to 500 (10% of new 
recruits are from the migrant community in the Southern 
Region in 2010), the project was eventually abandoned.75 
According to Alan Fraser, the lack of resources, staff and long-
term strategy contributed to the downfall of the project.76 
Following the union’s failed project, resentment towards 
immigrants was fuelled.  Reinforced by tabloids77 and due 
to their vulnerable and voiceless position, ‘immigrants easily 
became responsible for the increasing difficult economic 
conditions, especially low-skilled immigrants’.78 
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Lazzeri A. 2014. Southampton locals swamped by 25k influx say ‘too many people’. The Sun. 12 April. Available at: https://www.thesun.co.uk/archives/news/738664/
southampton-locals-swamped-by-25k-influx-say-too-many-people/. 
78 Interview with Alan Fraser, 6 June 2018.
79 Interviews with Councillor Andrew Pope and Denise Wyatt, 6 June 2018.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 McGhee D., Traverna  P. and Heath, S. 2015, Social Relationships and Relationships in Context : Post-Accession Poles in Southampton. Population, Space and Place, 
Vol. 21, 5, pp.433-445.
83 Interviews with Alan Whitehead MP and Councillor Matthew Claisse, 
84 Ibid.
It might be particularly difficult for the immigrants in the city 
given the resentment among the Polish population, as pointed 
out by Councillor Andrew Pope and Denise Wyatt.79 The 20th-
century Polish migrants to the UK are somewhat different to 
the migrant identity of post-accession Poles80. Whereas the 
former established close-knit associational ties amongst their 
group by participating in Church activities and Polish clubs, the 
latter prefers impersonal interactions with informal or Polish 
amenities. As a result, the newly-arrived Poles have distanced 
themselves from other Poles and avoid existing ‘community’ 
institutions. This, combined with a  lack of linguistic 
competence and integration with the non-Polish population, 
has led them to live very secular lives in Southampton.81 This 
argument, stressed in the interviews with Councillor Andrew 
Pope and Denise Wyatt, resonates with the qualitative study 
conducted in Southampton by McGhee et al, 2015.82
Nonetheless, there has not been any presence of overt racism 
or increase of violence against immigrants noted before or after 
the referendum.83 Councillor Matthew Claisse did not record 
or witness any discrimination against immigrants in his ward, 
which has the highest Polish population in Southampton.84 The 
hostile environment that is sometimes portrayed in some areas 
is not present in Southampton.
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A Brexit opportunity is to develop a skilled workforce able to 
compete internationally. Of the sectors identified, those that 
were most promising are transport and dock-related jobs.85 
The area has individual industrial strengths that can offer 
opportunity under Brexit. The Port of Southampton aims to 
focus on the potential for increasing trade with the rest of 
non-EU countries. 90% of exports are already destined for such 
countries, and the port already possesses much of the customs 
and other infrastructure that may be required post-Brexit.86 A 
£50 million investment in expanding vehicle handling facilities 
to 15,000 new spaces is due to be completed in Mid-2019, as 
Gareth Lewis, communications manager at Associated British 
Ports, pointed out.87 This explains the Brexit support among 
local businesses as raised by Neil McCullough.88 Southampton 
is not heavily reliant upon financial services with high exposure 
to EU markets like London or single economic hubs like 
Oxbridge.89 Instead, it is reliant on specialised economies which 
are not heavily dependent on EU funding. Less than 2% of goods 
passing through Southampton are subject to custom checks by 
officials according to Associated British Ports.90 This frictionless 
international commerce is a model that business leaders expect 
to replicate in other ports which are closely trading with EU 
countries after Brexit i.e. the Ports of Dover and Felixstowe.91 
Moreover, Southampton has excellent international 
connections. 81% of small businesses in the area trade 
85 Solent LEP report. 2017.
86 Ross. 2018. 
87 Southampton Port set for record export year, Institute of Export and International, July 2017, Available at: https://www.export.org.uk/news/354558/Southampton-
Port-set-for-record-export-year.htm.
88 Written Statement via Email by Neil McCullough, 28 May 2018.
89 Ibid.
90 MacLellan K. 2017. UK Customs models unlikely to achieve frictionless post-Brexit trade. Reuters. Available at: https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-ports/uk-
customs-model-unlikely-to-achieve-frictionless-post-brexit-trade-idUKKCN1BP20J. 
91 Ibid.
92 FedEx Report. 2015. Available at: https://technation.techcityuk.com/cluster/southampton/.
93 Written Statement via Email by Neil McCullough, 28 May 2018.
94 FedEx Report. 2015. 
95 Interview with Alan Fraser, 6 June 2018.
overseas according to a 2015 FedEx report which makes 
Southampton an ‘export epicentre’.92 This justifies the 
‘business as usual’ attitude in Southampton among local 
businesses, as stressed by Neil McCullough93. The Brexit 
challenge is now to have a negotiation deal able to protect 
and nurture this economic dynamism into the future. Even a 
softer model of Brexit could impose export and import duties 
that would increase costs and weaken in some way the free 
movement of goods.94
Alan Fraser highlights that it is necessary to promote the 
positive role of trade unions in combating discrimination and 
promoting equality and diversity in 
relation to immigrant and minority 
workers: for instance, by raising 
workplace awareness of 
the value of inclusion and 
diversity and helping to foster 
a receptive culture.95
of small businesses 
in the area trade 
overseas
2015 FedEx report 
18%
‘A Better Brexit’
Ways to tackle some of the problems and uncertainties created with Brexit 
involve investing in more qualified labour in dock-related areas, health services 
academic and high-tech while contributing to the integration of immigrants in 
the workplace and securing residents’ basic needs. 
<2%
of goods passing 
through Southampton 
are subject to custom 
checks by officials
Associated British Ports
12
In this process, he adds that it is necessary to acknowledge 
the specific vulnerabilities emerging from the interlocking 
contractual and migrant status and improve the existing 
educational tools to promote the self-determination of their 
migrant constituencies. Will Jennings addressed the need to 
revitalise the city centre while providing the basic needs of the 
population.96 More sectoral and cluster development in creative 
arts and culture, like in Winchester, could be considered.97 
Recent uplifting developments include the Cultural Quarter, 
which has linked various arts venues around the renovated 
Guildhall Square, with theatres, art galleries, concert venues 
and cafes brought together in a cohesive cluster. Future 
development is now focused on the Royal Pier, which opened 
at the end of the 19th century, yet has languished empty 
and unloved for over three decades after war damage and a 
series of fires.98 Developers are keen to transform it into an 
area containing bars, shops, a casino, a hotel and hundreds of 
homes. But progress has not been smooth – port operators 
remain concerned about traffic volume, and residents have 
reacted violently to plans for a multi-storey car park, calling it 
an ‘ugly monster’. The projected £450m scheme, linking the city 
centre to the waterfront, is due to be completed by 2023. But 
there are still doubts over its viability.99 
There is also an opportunity for the city to boost support 
and entrepreneurship by looking at sector-specific agencies 
such as Tech City UK.100 The £1.5m business start-up centre 
at Marlands, a Southampton shopping centre, which is set 
to open at the start of 2019, might pave the way for more 
entrepreneurial projects.  Web-based start-ups recently 
received funding with the launch of the pilot phase of ‘Z21 
Innovation Fund’, sponsored by the University of Southampton 
and the Solent Local Entreprise Partnership.101 Following 
Brexit, employment growth is expected to be relatively flat, 
with only 8,000 jobs in the South East region. A rise of such 
projects would accelerate job growth in high-value sectors and 
eventually close the productivity gap.102 All councillors and Alan 
Whitehead MP stress that these projects should of course go 
hand-in-hand with securing school placements for kids and 
viable housing prices.103 
96 Interview with Will Jennings, 17 May 2018.
97 Ibid.
98 Richardson A. 2017. Southampton in the spotlight : Boom times ahead for 
Titanic’s home town? The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.
com/cities/2017/dec/19/southampton-spotlight-titanic-maritime-
powerhouse-royal-pier. 
99 Ibid.
100 TechCity, Southampton Website. Available at https://technation.techcityuk.
com/cluster/southampton/
101 Solent LEP Report. 2017.
102 Ibid.
103 Interviews with all Councillors and Alan Whitehead MP.
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Appendix
Local Authority Data source Barnet Ceredigion Mansfield Pendle Southampton Country (countries included)
Electorate in Brexit referendum Electoral Commission 223467 53400 77624 64534 158171 46500001
United 
Kingdom
Number of valid votes in Brexit 
referendum
Electoral 
Commission 161033 39742 56344 45335 107665 33551983
United 
Kingdom
Percentage voting remain in Brexit 
referendum
Electoral 
Commission 62.2% 54.6% 29.1% 36.9% 46.2% 48.1%
United 
Kingdom
Percentage voting leave in Brexit 
referendum
Electoral 
Commission 37.8% 45.4% 70.9% 63.2% 53.8% 51.9%
United 
Kingdom
CEP estimate for soft Brexit effect 
(% of GVA) CEP -1.5% -1.2% -1.4% -1.2% -1.2% -1.3%
United 
Kingdom
CEP estimate for hard Brexit effect 
(% of GVA) CEP -2.2% -1.5% -2.0% -1.4% -1.9% -2.7%
United 
Kingdom
Percentage of live births to mothers 
not born in the UK ONS 58.7% 11.1% 17.1% 28.9% 34.8% 26.9%
United 
Kingdom
Percentage non-British ONS 20.8% 4.0% 7.6% 6.7% 19.7% 9.3% United Kingdom
Percentage non UK born ONS 39.0% 6.7% 8.6% 8.9% 22.9% 14.1% United Kingdom
Percentage born in UK, 2011 2011 Census 61.1% 94.0% 94.4% 89.1% 82.4% 86.6% England and Wales
Percentage born in other EU 
countries, 2011 2011 Census 10.4% 2.6% 3.5% 2.3% 6.7% 4.3%
England and 
Wales
Percentage white UK born APS 45.5% 92.5% 86.8% 80.4% 74.8% 79.7% United Kingdom
Percentage white not UK born APS 19.4% 4.4% 6.2% 4.7% 11.8% 6.8% United Kingdom
Percentage ethnic minority UK born APS 17.2% 0.9% 2.0% 6.4% 3.8% 6.5% United Kingdom
Percentage ethnic minority not UK born APS 18.0% 2.3% 5.0% 8.5% 9.6% 7.0% United Kingdom
Employment share: Agriculture, 
forestry & fishing BRES 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 1.6% Great Britain
Employment share: Mining, 
quarrying & utilities BRES 0.2% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 1.2% Great Britain
Employment share: Manufacturing BRES 2.3% 4.2% 9.8% 28.1% 3.4% 7.9% Great Britain
Employment share: Construction BRES 6.1% 5.8% 7.3% 4.7% 3.0% 4.7% Great Britain
Employment share: Motor trades BRES 1.3% 1.7% 2.4% 1.9% 1.7% 1.8% Great Britain
Employment share: Wholesale BRES 3.0% 2.0% 4.3% 3.9% 2.6% 3.9% Great Britain
Employment share: Retail BRES 11.4% 10.0% 12.2% 10.9% 9.4% 9.5% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Transport & storage (inc postal) BRES 3.0% 2.3% 2.2% 2.2% 6.8% 4.8% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Accommodation & food services BRES 6.8% 13.3% 6.1% 7.0% 6.8% 7.4% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Information & communication BRES 4.5% 1.3% 1.5% 3.9% 6.0% 4.1% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Financial & insurance BRES 1.9% 0.8% 1.5% 1.4% 3.0% 3.5% Great Britain
Employment share: Property BRES 4.5% 1.5% 0.9% 1.4% 1.5% 1.7% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Professional, scientific & technical BRES 11.4% 3.3% 4.3% 3.9% 5.1% 8.7% Great Britain
Appendix 1: Sociodemographic/voting/economy
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Local Authority Data source Barnet Ceredigion Mansfield Pendle Southampton Country (countries included)
Employment share: Business 
administration & support services BRES 8.3% 2.0% 12.2% 4.7% 12.0% 8.8% Great Britain
Employment share: Public 
administration & defence BRES 3.4% 6.7% 4.3% 2.5% 4.3% 4.2% Great Britain
Employment share: Education BRES 11.4% 20.0% 8.5% 9.4% 12.0% 8.6% Great Britain
Employment share: Health BRES 15.2% 13.3% 14.6% 10.9% 17.1% 13.0% Great Britain
Employment share: Arts, entertainment, 
recreation & other services
BRES 5.3% 5.0% 4.3% 2.5% 3.8% 4.6% Great Britain
Percentage with NVQ level 4+, 
aged 16-64
APS 54.0% 31.4% 17.5% 21.5% 36.0% 38.4% United 
Kingdom
Percentage with no qualifications, 
aged 16-64
APS 5.5% 7.6% 11.2% 9.1% 7.4% 8.0% United 
Kingdom
Population, 2017 APS 389,700 74,800 105,800 89,700 250,900 65,114,500 United 
Kingdom
Social Mobility Index 
(ranking out of 324)
Social 
Mobility Index
9 Not 
available
315 144 247 Not 
applicable
Not 
applicable
General Election 2015: 
Percentage Conservative
Electoral 
Commission
49.5% 11.0% 28.2% 47.2% 39.7% 36.8% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2015: 
Percentage Labour
Electoral 
Commission
38.4% 9.7% 39.4% 34.9% 19.1% 30.4% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2015: 
Percentage UKIP
Electoral 
Commission
5.5% 10.2% 25.1% 12.2% 12.8% 12.6% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2015: Turnout Electoral 
Commission
68.0% 69.0% 60.9% 68.8% 63.4% 66.4% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Percentage 
Conservative
Electoral 
Commission
47.1% 18.4% 46.6% 49.0% 42.8% 42.4% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Percentage 
Labour
Electoral 
Commission
45.2% 20.2% 44.5% 46.2% 47.7% 40.0% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Percentage 
UKIP
Electoral 
Commission
0.6% 1.5% 5.3% 0.0% 1.0% 1.8% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Turnout Electoral 
Commission
70.5% 73.3% 64.5% 69.0% 67.1% 68.8% United 
Kingdom
Price level, 2016 
(regional, relative to UK index of 100)
ONS 107.2 98.1 99.6 98.8 101.5 100.0 United 
Kingdom
House price, 2017 
(mean transaction price)
Land Registry £691,914 £224,337 £148,961 £114,441 £268,534 £345,715 England and 
Wales
Notes
Employment by ethnicity data is obtained from Nomis but is not included here due to space constraints
Electoral comission data for the EU referendum is available at https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-
elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information
The Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) paper is available at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit10.pdf
The ONS migration data is available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/migrationwithintheuk/datasets/
localareamigrationindicatorsunitedkingdom
Data from the Census, Annual Population Survey (APS), and Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) are available at Noms: https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/
The Social Mobility Index is only available for England
ONS regional price data is available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/articles/relativeregionalconsumerpricelevelsuk/2016 
House Price data is available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/price-paid-data-downloads
Electoral Comission data for the 2015 and 2017 general elections is available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/our-research/electoral-data/
electoral-data-files-and-reports
General election voting data is available at the parliamentary constituency level whereas this project focuses on local authorities. We impute local authority level data 
by fitting constituencies into local authorities. For Ceredigion, Mansfield and Pendle, the parliamentary constituency is equivalent to the local authority. Barnet is a 
combination of three parliamentary constituencies, namely: Finchley and Golders Green, Hendon, and Chipping Barnet. For these four local authorities there is no issue in 
obtaining local authority level general election data. Southampton is constructed of two full constituencies - Test and Itchen - and part of the constituency Romsey and 
Southampton North. To obtain general election data for Southampton, we use the population-weighted mean of the general election results for these constituencies. This 
requires us to assume that the voting behaviour of voters in the section of Romsey and Southampton North that is in the local authority Southampton is equivalent to the 
proportion that is outside of Southampton local authority. We believe that this is a reasonable assumption. Further, it only affects a 11.9% of the Southampton population, 
so any induced error is likely to be relatively very small.
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Percentage decrease in local authority 
GVA: Hard Brexit (Dhingra et al. 2017)
Percentage decrease in local authority 
GVA: Soft Brexit (Dhingra et al. 2017)
Appendix 2: Post Brexit percentage decrease in local authority
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